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Abstract 
 
Much of the literature on the airline industry identifies a potential entrant to a market based on whether the relevant 
carrier has presence in at least one of the endpoint airports of the market without actually operating between the 
endpoints. Furthermore, a potential entrant is often defined as a credible “entry threat” to market incumbents once 
the potential entrant establishes presence at the second endpoint airport of the market. This paper provides evidence 
that even when a potential entrant has presence at both endpoint airports of a market, incumbents may not respond to 
this as an effective “entry threat”.  Specifically, we find that: (1) incumbents lower price by more when the potential 
entrant has a hub at one or both market endpoints; and  (2) incumbents increase rather than lower their price if they 
have an alliance partnership with the “potential entrant”.       
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1. Introduction 
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and Morrison (2001) find evidence that incumbent 
airlines tend to cut fares in response to actual entry as well as the “threat” of entry by Southwest 
Airlines, while Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2013) investigate the impact of potential competition 
from low cost carriers (LCC) and find similar results.  Much of this literature identifies a 
potential entrant based on whether the relevant carrier has presence in at least one of the endpoint 
airports of the market without actually operating between the endpoints.  Furthermore, Goolsbee 
and Syverson (2008) among others elevate the status of a potential entrant to a credible “entry 
threat” to market incumbents once the potential entrant establishes presence at the second 
endpoint airport of the market.  However, a key point we make in this paper is that even when 
potential entrants have presence at both endpoint airports of a market, these “potential entrants” 
may not all be effective “competitive threats” to incumbents in the market. 
First, some potential entrants will be better able to exploit economies of passenger-traffic 
density than others.  A carrier enjoys economies of passenger-traffic density when its marginal 
cost of transporting a passenger falls as the volume of passengers it transports increases 
[Brueckner and Spiller (1994)].  The carriers that can better exploit economies of passenger-
traffic density will have lower marginal cost upon actual entry, and therefore provide more of a 
competitive threat to incumbents.  We capture potential entrants’ ability to exploit economies of 
passenger-traffic density based on whether the potential entrant uses at least one of the market 
endpoint airports as a hub.  The argument is that if a market endpoint is a hub for a potential 
entrant, then upon actual entry in this market, this hub airport will enable the carrier to transport 
a larger volume of passengers on flights between the endpoints since many of these passengers 
may just be connecting through the endpoint hub.  Therefore, an endpoint hub airport can enable 
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the carrier to have lower marginal cost in the market due to the relatively high volume of 
passengers it will transport between the endpoints of the market.    
Second, we argue that some carriers that have presence at the market endpoint airports 
without operating between these endpoints may incentivize market incumbents to increase rather 
than decrease price.  Specifically, we posit that if the carrier present at the endpoint airports has 
an alliance partnership with an incumbent, this alliance partnership can enable the incumbent to 
charge a higher price due to consumers’ increased preference for alliance partners’ products.  An 
alliance may increase consumers’ preference for partner carriers’ products since passengers have 
greater opportunities to accumulate and redeem frequent-flyer miles across partner carriers 
[Lederman (2007)], especially when partner carriers’ networks are complementary rather than 
overlapping.    
We draw inference on our hypotheses from a reduced-form price regression in which 
market-level price charged by incumbents is regressed on various market characteristic controls 
as well as measures of the characteristics of the set of potential entrants to a market.  Following 
the literature we identify potential entrants to a market based on the set of airlines that have 
presence in at least one endpoint airport of the market.  However, we go a step further to 
distinguish between potential entrants that have presence at both market endpoints based on: (1) 
whether a market endpoint airport is a hub for a potential entrant; and (2) whether a potential 
entrant has an alliance partnership with any of the market incumbents.   
Consistent with our arguments above, the econometric estimates suggest that incumbents 
lower price by more when potential entrants have a hub at one or both market endpoints.  That is, 
potential entrants that have a hub at the market endpoint seem to pose a greater competitive 
threat to incumbents in the market.  Perhaps due to this type of potential entrant’s unique ability 
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to better exploit economies of passenger-traffic density upon actual entry.  Also consistent with 
our arguments above, the econometric estimates suggest that incumbents increase rather than 
lower their price if they have an alliance partnership with the “potential entrant”.  In sum, 
incumbents seem to be most threatened by potential entrants that they are not allied with and 
when these potential entrants use the market endpoint airports as their hub.  
The analysis in our paper also constitutes a methodological extension to the analysis in 
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008).  In particular, when analyzing incumbents’ response to the threat 
of entry, our empirical framework accounts for the fact that market structure is endogenous, and 
therefore is able to mitigate potential biases in estimating incumbents’ responses.  For example, 
shocks to demand or costs that are unobserved by researchers, but observed by firms can jointly 
influence existing firm’s pricing decisions and potential entrants’ decisions to enter the market 
[Evans, Froeb, and Werden (1993)].  As such, the estimate of incumbents’ pricing response to 
entry may either be biased upwards or downwards if we do not account for endogenous entry 
decisions associated with these demand and cost shocks.  The empirical methodology we use to 
account for endogenous market structure is closest to Singh and Zhu (2008) and Berry (1992). 
Given that our empirical analysis focuses on incumbents’ response to the “threat” of 
entry, we believe this focus places the paper as part of the entry deterrence literature.  The 
question of entry deterrence has been examined extensively from a theoretical perspective,1
                                                 
1 See for example, Dixit (1979), Spence (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Aghion and Bolton (1987), Klemperer 
(1987), Farrell and Klemperer (2004), and Kwoka (2008). 
 but 
with the exception of our paper, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Huse and Oliveira (2012), 
Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2013), Gayle and Xie (2013) and Morrison (2001), formal empirical 
analysis of this issue is scarce.  In addition to the entry deterrence literature, a distinct but related 
strand of literature studies the issue of how actual entry or competition, instead of the threat of 
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entry, affects prices. Notable contributions to this literature include, Berry (1990, 1992); 
Borenstein (1989, 1990, 1991, 1992); Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992); Brueckner and Spiller 
(1994); Chen and Savage (2011); Evans and Kessides (1993, 1994); Evans, Froeb, and Werden 
(1993); and Ito and Lee (2004) among others.  Our empirical model also measures incumbents’ 
price response to actual entry, and therefore is able to contribute to this literature as well.     
Along with our two key findings previously described, our econometric estimates yield 
other interesting results.  First, as expected, an increase in the number of actual entrants reduces 
profitability, which coincides with results in Berry (1992).  Second, incumbents’ price response 
is different when faced with increased actual competitors compared to increased entry threat.  In 
particular, incumbents seem to cut price more in response to an increase in actual number of 
competitors, as compared to an increase in the number of firms that threaten to enter.  Third, 
when the endogeneity of market structure is taken into account, we find that the average price 
effect of actual entry is marginally larger compared to when endogeneity is not taken into 
consideration.  Conversely, when the endogeneity of market structure is taken into account, the 
average price effect of an entry threat is marginally smaller compared to when endogeneity is not 
taken into account. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Important definitions used throughout the 
paper are collected in section 2.  Section 3 outlines the econometric model.  Estimation 
techniques are discussed in section 4.  Section 5 describes the data used in estimation.  We 
discuss results in section 6, and offer concluding remarks in section 7.    
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2. Definitions    
A market is defined as directional round-trip air travel between an origin city and a 
destination city.  For example, round-trip air travel from Atlanta to Denver is a distinct market 
from round-trip air travel from Denver to Atlanta.     
A product is defined as a unique combination of airline and flight itinerary.  Consider the 
market from Atlanta to Denver for example.  Possible products are: (1) a nonstop trip from 
Atlanta to Denver operated by Delta Air Lines; and (2) a nonstop trip from Atlanta to Denver 
operated by United Airlines.  Note that both products are in the same market.     
An airline is defined as being an incumbent in a market during the time period that the 
airline offers air travel product(s) in the market.  In our study, incumbents are the existing 
carriers that offer nonstop online itineraries in each origin-destination market.  On the other hand, 
a carrier is considered as a potential entrant to a nonstop market when this carrier operates in at 
least one endpoint city of the market in the period preceding the entry period under consideration.  
For example, suppose that an incumbent, Delta Air Lines, currently operates a flight from 
Atlanta (ATL) to Denver (DEN).  Any airline that flies between Atlanta and cities other than 
Denver in the preceding period, is considered a potential entrant to the ATL-DEN market.  
Similarly, any airline that flies between Denver and cities other than Atlanta in the preceding 
period, is also considered a potential entrant to the ATL-DEN market.    
Figure 1 shows three cities and two airlines’ operations between these cities.  Solid 
arrows mean that the airline is actually offering flights between the cities, while dashed arrows 
means that the airline is a potential entrant to the market and therefore has presence in at least 
one of the relevant market’s endpoint cities in the period preceding the entry period under 
consideration.  As illustrated in Figure 1, American Airlines (AA) operates a route from Atlanta 
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to Chicago (ORD) but not to Denver.  Since this airline has been offering service from Atlanta to 
cities other than Denver, it is likely that AA can more easily start flying the ATL-DEN route in 
the near future compared to another airline that does not have a presence in Atlanta. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, it is also possible that in the period preceding the entry period 
under consideration, American Airlines may operate service in both endpoint cities (ATL and 
DEN) without actually offering service between these two cities.  Here, American Airlines 
provides service from Atlanta to cities other than Denver, such as a route from Atlanta to 
Chicago.  In addition, American Airlines also provides service from Kansas City to Denver.     
 
                                                                                                                 
                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Destination     Origin 
 
 
Figure 1  
Identification of a Potential Entrant  
 
Atlanta Denver 
Chicago 
Delta is an incumbent 
AA service 
AA is a potential entrant 
by operating in one 
endpoint airport 
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Comparing the scenarios in Figures 1 and 2, we might expect that American Airlines is 
even more likely to offer service from ATL-DEN when the airline has presence at both endpoint 
cities compared to just one endpoint city.  Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) document that a carrier 
is 70 times more likely to enter a market when it already has operations at both endpoint cities.  
As such, throughout this paper we define an “entry threat” as a situation in which an airline has 
presence at both endpoint cities without offering service between the two cities.  Based on 
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) among others, Figure 2 describes a situation in which American 
Airlines poses a credible entry threat to incumbents in the ATL-DEN market.  Incumbents, like 
Delta in our example, may take actions in response to entry threats before American Airlines 
actually starts flying the ATL-DEN route.  For example, as documented by Goolsbee and 
Syverson (2008), we can expect to see changes in incumbents’ price when facing such 
heightened entry threat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Destination             Origin 
 
 
Figure 2  
High Probability of Entry  
 
Atlanta Denver 
Chicago 
Delta is an incumbent 
AA service 
AA threatens to enter 
given its presence in 
both endpoint airports 
Kansas City 
AA service 
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3. The Model   
Applying methodologies from Singh and Zhu (2008) and Berry (1992),2
A discrete choice framework is used to make inferences about firm profits.  In the 
structure of a strategic game, behavior in the market reflects the interaction of multiple agents’ 
decisions.  Therefore, econometric estimation is based on an oligopolistic equilibrium concept in 
this study.  Similar in spirit to Berry (1992), firm k’s latent profit in market m with 𝑁𝑚𝑎  
competitors can be expressed as follows: 
 we investigate 
how incumbents respond to the threat of entry.  Our model provides an empirical framework to 
examine strategic interactions in an oligopolistic market, which allows us to study the 
relationship between prices and market structure in the airline industry.   
 
 𝜋𝑚𝑘(𝑁𝑚𝑎 ) = 𝑋𝑚𝛽 + 𝛿𝜋 𝑙𝑛(𝑁𝑚𝑎 ) + 𝜆𝜋𝑙𝑛(𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡) + 𝛼𝑍𝑚𝑘 + 𝜀𝑚𝑘,   (1) 
 where  𝜀𝑚𝑘 = 𝜂𝑢𝑚0 + 𝜔𝑢𝑚𝑘.       (2) 
 
A unit of observation for the profit equation above is at the firm-level.  For each market 
in the data, any carrier serving the market becomes an observation for that market along with any 
carrier serving at least one of the market endpoints.  The vector 𝑋𝑚 represents observed profit-
shifting variables that vary only by market, and 𝛽 is a vector of parameters associated with these 
profit-shifting variables.  In our empirical application, the measured market characteristics 
included in 𝑋𝑚  are: Population;3 Income; 4
                                                 
2 Also see Dunn (2008) for a similar methodology. 
 Nonstop Flight Distance; Nonstop Flight Distance 
3 Similar to Berry (1992), Population is measured by the product of population from the origin and destination cities. 
4 As we describe in the data section of the paper, the variable Income is measured by the product of median incomes 
at the origin and destination cities. 
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Squared; and Slot_dummy.5
𝑍𝑚𝑘 is a vector of observed firm-specific profit-shifting variables based on information in 
the period preceding the entry period under consideration.  Three firm-specific variables 
included in our empirical application are: City2; Hub_dummy; and City2*Alliance_dummy.  
City2 is a zero-one dummy variable that takes a value of one only if the firm operates in both 
endpoint cities in the period preceding the entry period under consideration.  Based on our 
previous discussion in the definitions section, we expect its parameter to be positive.  
Hub_dummy equals to 1 if either one or both market endpoints is a hub for the carrier.  
City2*Alliance_dummy equals to 1 if the carrier operates at both market endpoints in the period 
preceding the entry period under consideration, and has an alliance partner present at one or both 
market endpoints.              
  𝑁𝑚𝑎  is the equilibrium number of firms that actually enters market m.  
As such, the characteristics of rival firms affect firm k via the equilibrium number of firms in a 
given market.  𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the number of potential entrants that poses a real entry threat to market m 
in terms of having a presence at both endpoint airports in the period preceding the entry period 
under consideration, but does not actually enter the relevant market during the entry period.  𝛿𝜋 
and 𝜆𝜋  are parameters that capture marginal effects of actual entry and the threat of entry 
respectively on firm k’s latent profit.   
 𝜀𝑚𝑘 is a component of profit that is observed by all firms, but unobserved to researchers. 
This unobserved profit component is decomposed into two terms according to equation (2).  𝑢𝑚0 
represents unobserved market characteristics that are common across firms, while 𝑢𝑚𝑘 captures 
firm-specific unobservables.  Both 𝑢𝑚0  and 𝑢𝑚𝑘  are unobserved by the econometricians, but 
observed by all firms.  We further assume that 𝑢𝑚0  and 𝑢𝑚𝑘  are independent and identically 
                                                 
5 Slot_dummy equals to 1 if any of the airports are slot-controlled, which are New York LaGuardia, New York 
Kennedy, Washington National, and Chicago O'Hare. 
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standard normally distributed across firms and markets.  For identification, we impose the 
traditional constraint that the variance of the unobservable (𝜀𝑚𝑘) equals one, via the restriction 
ω = �1 − η2.  Here 𝜂 is the correlation of the unobservable 𝜀𝑚𝑘 across firms in a given market.   
 The issue of interest is the pricing behavior of incumbents given the presence of numbers 
of actual competitors and potential competitors that are threatening to enter.  Similar in spirit to 
Singh and Zhu (2008), a market-level pricing regression intended to examine this issue can be 
expressed as follows:          𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑚) = 𝑋𝑚𝜙 + 𝛿𝑝𝑁𝑚𝑎 + 𝜆𝑝𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑝 ,                                       (3) 
where 𝑝𝑚 is a market descriptive statistic (median, 25
th or 75th percentile) of price charged in 
market m; 𝑋𝑚 are observed market structure variables which can affect price; 𝑁𝑚𝑎  is the number 
of actual competitors in market m;  𝛿𝑝 is a parameter that captures the marginal effect of actual 
entry on price;  𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the number of potential entrants that poses a real entry threat to market m; 
and  𝜆𝑝 is a parameter that captures the pricing effect of the “threat” of entry.  𝜀𝑚
𝑝  is a random 
error term.   
There are two things worth noting at this point.  First, note that the unit of analysis for the 
pricing regression is at the market level, which is different from the firm-level unit of analysis 
for the profit equation.  Second, we have referred to 𝑁𝑚𝑎  as the number of “actual competitors” as 
well as the number of “actual entrants”.  This is because, in the context of our static entry model 
that is used to draw inference from a cross-section of sample markets, “actual competitors” and 
“actual entrants” are equivalent and will simply be measured by the number of competing firms 
observed in each sample market in our data. 
 The concern in equation (3) is the potential correlation between unobservable  𝜀𝑚
𝑝    and 
𝑁𝑚
𝑎 , which will result in biased and inconsistent estimate of 𝛿𝑝.  Particularly, demand shocks that 
11 
 
are unobserved to researchers but observed by firms can influence not only firms’ pricing, but 
also alter firms’ decision to operate in the market.  For example, a positive unobserved demand 
shock will increase prices in a market, and attract more entrants as well.  If this positive demand 
shock is not controlled for when estimating the relationship between 𝑁𝑚𝑎  and 𝑝𝑚for instance, then 
an estimated negative effect between 𝑁𝑚𝑎  and 𝑝𝑚 will likely be understated since the observed 
data will contain situations in which relatively large 𝑁𝑚𝑎  is associated with relatively high prices 
due to positive demand shocks that are not accounted for in the regression [see Manuszak and 
Moul (2008)].  In general, shocks to demand or cost that are unobserved by researchers, but 
observed by firms are likely to yield a problem of underestimation or overestimation of 
parameters in equation (3).    
In order to correct for endogenous market structure in the pricing regression, we impose 
the following restriction on error terms in the price and profit equations:6
                                  �𝑢𝑚0
𝜀𝑚
𝑝 �~𝐵𝑉𝑁 ��00� , �1𝜌 𝜌𝜎𝑝2��,                                                           (4) 
 
where 𝜀𝑚
𝑝  and 𝑢𝑚0 are error terms from the price and profit equations, and 𝜌 is the covariance 
between the two.    The conditional mean of 𝜀𝑚
𝑝  given 𝑢𝑚0 is equal to ρ𝑢𝑚0, with the assumption 
of normally distributed error terms.  Thus, we can construct the conditional expectation of the 
error term in the price regression by using iterated expectation as follows: 
𝐸�𝜀𝑚
𝑝 �𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡� = 𝜌𝐸[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡], 
where 𝑍𝑚 represents the market-level collection of  𝑍𝑚𝑘 vectors for carrier k in market m.  We can then 
consider the following modified pricing regression equation: 
           𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑚) = 𝑋𝑚𝜙 + 𝛿𝑝𝑁𝑚𝑎 + 𝜆𝑝𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜌𝐸[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡] + 𝜐𝑚𝑝  ,            (5) 
                                                 
6 See Singh and Zhu (2008) for a similar restriction. 
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where the error term 𝜐𝑚
𝑝 = 𝜀𝑚𝑝 − 𝐸�𝜀𝑚𝑝 �𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡� is now the pure idiosyncratic error term, 
and 𝜌 is simply an additional parameter to be estimated in equation (5), which is the coefficient 
on the regressor, 𝐸[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡].  The distinction between equations (3) and (5) is the 
conditional expectation of the error term, which captures the potential correlation between 
unobserved shocks and the market structure in market m.   Note that Goolsbee and Syverson 
(2008) did not take into account that 𝑁𝑚𝑎  is endogenous in their pricing equation.  Our 
specification of pricing regression (5) is a key methodological extension to their work.     
 
4. Estimation  
Generalized method of moments (GMM) is used to estimate parameters in the profit 
equation, while ordinary least squares is used to estimate parameters in the pricing equation.  We 
first describe how the profit equation is estimated, and then describe how the price equation is 
estimated.  
 
4.1 Estimating the Profit Equation 
To begin, it is necessary to use equation (1) to predict the equilibrium number of firms, 
𝑁𝑚
𝑎 , that will enter market m based on the following:  
𝑁�𝑚
𝑎 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛
(𝑛: #{𝑘: 𝜋𝑚𝑘(𝑛, 𝜀𝑚𝑘) ≥ 0}) (6) 
𝑁�𝑚
𝑎  is the largest integer among 1,2,…,Km such that all firms that choose to enter have non-
negative profits in a given market m; and  𝐾𝑚 is the total number of potential entrants to market 
m. 7
                                                 
7 Looking at the profit function in equations (1) and (6) might leave the reader curious as to why we use 𝑁𝑚𝑎  to 
denote number of firms in equation (1), but 𝑛 to denote number of firms in equation (6).  To understand the need for 
differing notations, it is key to note that equation (1) is an empirical specification of the profit function, while 
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Following Berry (1992), we use two periods (periods 1 and 2) of data to determine  𝐾𝑚 
for a given market.8
As discussed in Berry (1992), due to firm heterogeneity, captured by 𝑍𝑚𝑘  and 𝜀𝑚𝑘  in 
equation (1), equation (6) does not have a closed-form solution.  Berry (1992) proposes using 
simulation, along with a sequential order-of-entry assumption,
  Period 2 is the relevant period for analyzing strategic entry and competitive 
effects, while period 1 is only used to help identify the set of potential entrants that may enter in 
period 2.  As such, in period 1 we identify airlines that have a presence in at least one endpoint 
airport of the market.  In addition, we identify airlines that are actually serving the market in 
period 2.  For purposes of the static entry model, the set of potential entrants, 𝐾𝑚, includes the 
airlines with endpoint airport presence in period 1 plus the airlines that are actually serving the 
market in period 2.  So for some airlines included in 𝐾𝑚, “entry” is equivalent to a decision “not 
to exit” in period 2.   
9 to approximate the expected 
number of firms that will enter a market and the identity of the entering firms.  Specifically, we 
first take Rm independent random draws of the random portion of firms’ profit, 
� 𝑢𝑚0𝑟 ,𝑢𝑚1𝑟 , … ,𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑚𝑟 �, from a standard normal probability distribution, where draws are indexed 
by r.10
                                                                                                                                                             
equation (6) describes a mathematical problem.  In equation (1), 𝑁𝑚𝑎  is representing the number of actual firms 
observed in a market from the data.  However, equation (6) is positing that 𝑁𝑚𝑎  can be thought of as a solution to a 
mathematical problem, where the choice variable in the mathematical problem is 𝑛, and the optimal choice of 𝑛, i.e., 
the solution to the mathematical problem is 𝑁𝑚𝑎 .  So 𝑛 in equation (6) is mathematically referring to a more general 
variable that can take on a range of integer values. 
  With � 𝑢𝑚0𝑟 , 𝑢𝑚1𝑟 , … , 𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑚𝑟 � in hand, along with the variables, 𝑋𝑚 and 𝑍𝑚𝑘 , and guesses 
of , , , 𝜆𝜋, and  , we can solve the system of  𝐾𝑚 profit equations for the equilibrium 
number of firms, 𝑛𝑚𝑟� �𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚𝑘 ,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋,𝜆𝜋,𝜂, 𝑢𝑚0𝑟 ,𝑢𝑚1𝑟 , … ,𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑚𝑟 � , that is expected to enter 
8 As we discuss further in the data section, a period in the data set is one quarter.  Period 1 is quarter 1 in the data, 
while period 2 is quarter 3.  As explained in Berry (1992), it will take approximately six months for an airline to 
implement operations in a market they have chosen to enter.    
9 We assume most profitable firms enter first. 
10 In this study we use 300 independent random draws of the random portion of firms’ profit, i.e., Rm = 300. 
α β πδ η
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market m on each rth draw.  In addition, we can construct a firm-specific zero-one indicator 
variable, 𝑎𝑚𝑘𝑟��𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚𝑘,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋,𝜆𝜋,𝜂,𝑢𝑚0𝑟 ,𝑢𝑚1𝑟 , … ,𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑚𝑟 �, that takes the value 1 only if firm k 
is predicted to enter market m on the rth draw of the random portion of profit.  In order to reduce 
simulation error,  𝑛𝑚𝑟�  and 𝑎𝑚𝑘𝑟�  are averaged across simulation draws to obtain: 
 
𝑁𝑚
𝑎� (𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋, 𝜂) = 1𝑅𝑚 ∑ 𝑛𝑚𝑟� �𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚𝑘 ,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋,𝜂,𝑢𝑚0𝑟 ,𝑢𝑚1𝑟 , … ,𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑚𝑟 �𝑅𝑚𝑟=1          (7) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑚𝑘� (𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚𝑘 ,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋,𝜂) =
1
𝑅𝑚
∑ 𝑎𝑚𝑘𝑟��𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚𝑘 ,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋,𝜂,𝑢𝑚0𝑟 ,𝑢𝑚1𝑟 , … ,𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑚𝑟 �𝑅𝑚𝑟=1 ,      (8) 
 
where 𝑁𝑚𝑎�  and  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑚𝑘�  are the expected number of firms to enter market m and the probability 
that firm k enters market m respectively.   
 Note that  1
𝑅𝑚
∑ 𝑎𝑚𝑘𝑟� (∙)𝑅𝑚𝑟=1  is an accept-reject frequency simulator of the firm entry 
probability.  As such, firm entry probabilities are not smooth and continuous functions of the 
parameters, which can make estimation challenging since the entry probabilities are not 
differentiable in parameter space.  The reason why 1
𝑅𝑚
∑ 𝑎𝑚𝑘𝑟� (∙)𝑅𝑚𝑟=1  is not smooth and 
continuous in parameter space is owing to 𝑎𝑚𝑘𝑟(∙)�  being only able to take two possible values - 
zero or one.  So for different parameter values, 𝑎𝑚𝑘𝑟(∙)�  can only switch between zero and one 
making it a step-like function in parameter space. 
To achieve differentiability of the entry probability functions in parameter space, we 
replace the accept-reject frequency simulator with a “smooth” simulator, 1
𝑅𝑚
∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑘𝑟(∙)𝑅𝑚𝑟=1 , where  
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?̂?𝑚𝑘𝑟(∙) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑟 − 𝑛�𝑚𝑟)1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑟 − 𝑛�𝑚𝑟) (9) 
 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑟 is firm k simulated profit rank among the Km potential entrants on the rth draw, and 
𝑛�𝑚𝑟  is the predicted number of firms that will enter market m on the rth draw.  Since our 
sequential order-of-entry assumption is that the most profitable firms enter first on a given draw 
of the random portion of profit, then firm k is predicted to enter market m on the rth draw if 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑟 ≥ 𝑛�𝑚𝑟 , otherwise firm k is not predicted to enter.  Therefore, (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑟 − 𝑛�𝑚𝑟) is 
correlated with the probability of entry and is reasonable to use in our smooth simulator.   
Note that unlike the right-hand-side of equation (8), the right-hand-side of equation (9) 
can take any real number between 0 and 1, and the specific real number taken by the right-hand-
side of equation (9) depends on the parameter values.  Therefore, the right-hand-side of equation 
(9) is continuous in the parameters, and the logit functional form makes it smooth in parameter 
space. 
From the data, we observe the actual number of airlines serving a market, 𝑁𝑚𝑎  .  In 
addition, we can construct from the data a zero-one indicator variable for each potential entrant, 
𝐼𝑚𝑘, that takes the value 1 only if firm k actually serves market m.  The following two equations 
therefore form the basis for our estimation strategy:  
𝑁𝑚
𝑎 = 𝑁𝑚𝑎� (𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋,𝜂) + 𝜈𝑚 
𝐼𝑚𝑘 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑚𝑘� (𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚𝑘 ,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋,𝜂) + 𝜇𝑚𝑘 
(10) 
(11) 
The prediction errors, 𝑣𝑚 and 𝜇𝑚𝑘, are then used to form moment conditions in order to estimate 
the parameters via GMM. 
Our assumption that  𝑣𝑚 and 𝜇𝑚𝑘 are mean independent of the exogenous data, yield the 
following moment conditions:  
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𝑚1(θ) = 1𝑇1 𝐻′ �𝑁𝑚𝑎 − 𝑁𝑚𝑎� (𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋, 𝜂)� = 0 
𝑚2(θ) = 1𝑇2 𝐻′ �𝐼𝑚𝑘 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑚𝑘� (𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚𝑘 ,𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋,𝜂)� = 0 
(12) 
(13) 
where 𝜃 is simply a parameter vector containing 𝛽,𝛼, 𝛿𝜋, 𝜆𝜋, and 𝜂; 𝑇1 is the number of markets; 
𝑇2 is the number of firm-level observations across the sample markets; and H is a matrix of 
instruments that include the interactions of Population with Nonstop Flight Distance and 
Nonstop Flight Distance Squared . 
We obtain the GMM estimates for the profit equation by solving: 11
𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝜃�
�𝑚�𝜃��
′
𝑊𝑚(𝜃�)�  (14) 
where 𝑚�𝜃�� = �𝑚1�𝜃��
𝑚2�𝜃��
� and W is the following block diagonal positive definite weight 
matrix:12
where ?̃?1and ?̃?2are the residual vectors from moment conditions, 𝑚1(∙) and 𝑚2(∙) respectively.  
   
𝑊 =
⎝
⎜
⎛
�
1T1 H′e�1e�1′ H�−1 𝟎
𝟎 �
1T2 H′e�2e�2′ H�−1⎠⎟
⎞
 
     
 4.2 Estimating the Price Equation 
As mentioned in the model section, the main methodological contribution in this study is 
to construct a correction term to account for potential correlation between price errors and 
market structure variables.  In particular, we showed in the model section that the appropriate 
                                                 
11 Our MATLAB computer code uses the simplex search method (fminsearch command) to minimize the GMM 
objective function.  The fminsearch routine iterates with successive tries at values for the profit function parameter 
vector, (θ� (1), θ�(2), θ�(3), … ), until the associated value of the GMM objective function converges to a minimum value.   
12 The optimal W is given by the inverse of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of 𝑚�𝜃��. 
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correction term is to include the conditional mean, 𝐸[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡], as a regressor in the 
price equation.  However, there is no closed-form solution for 𝐸[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡] with firm 
heterogeneity, so in the spirit of Singh and Zhu (2008) we use a simulation technique to 
approximate this conditional mean as follows:  
𝐸�[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡] = 1𝑅𝑚�𝑢𝑚0𝑟 � (?̂?𝑚𝑘𝑟)𝐼𝑚𝑘(1 − ?̂?𝑚𝑘𝑟)1−𝐼𝑚𝑘𝐾𝑚𝑘=1 �
𝑅𝑚
𝑟=1
 (15) 
where the term in square brackets is the simulated probability of observing the actual market 
structure in the data for market m on the rth draw, and ?̂?𝑚𝑘𝑟 is based on the smooth firm entry 
probability function in equation (9).13
 In summary, we use a two-stage estimation procedure.  At the first stage we estimate the 
profit equation using GMM as described above.  We then use the estimated profit equation 
parameters along with equation (15) to compute the endogeneity correction term,  
𝐸�[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡].  In the second stage we use ordinary least squares to estimate the linear 
pricing equation, in which 𝐸�[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡] is a regressor.  This procedure is similar to 
the two-step estimation used in Singh and Zhu (2008) to study the relationship between prices 
and market structure for the auto rental industry. 
  
 
5. Data 
Data are obtained from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which are 
collected by the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  DB1B is a 10% random sample of 
airline tickets from reporting carriers.  The data include information such as: (i) origin and 
destination airports on each ticket itinerary; (ii) the nonstop flight distance between the origin 
                                                 
13 Instead of using a smooth simulator, as we did, to approximate the conditional mean of 𝑢𝑚0, Singh and Zhu (2008) 
uses an accept-reject frequency simulator.  
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and destination airports; (iii) the airline that transports the passengers on a given ticket itinerary; 
(iv) the price of the ticket; and (v) the number of passengers that purchase a ticket with given 
itinerary characteristics.  We are most interested in the DB1BMarket file in the database, which 
contains directional market characteristics of each itinerary.  Similar in spirit to Berry (1992), we 
focus on U.S. domestic flights offered and operated by U.S. carriers in a single year, which is 
2007 in our study.   
To identify potential entrants in each market, we treat the first quarter of 2007 as the first 
period and the third quarter of 2007 as the second period.  The idea is to construct a single 
dataset that uses information from these two periods.  As previously discussed in the estimation 
section, period 2 is the relevant period for analyzing strategic entry and competitive effects, 
while period 1 is only used to help identify the set of potential entrants that may enter in period 2.   
We enforce some data restrictions in each period.  First, only itineraries in the 48 states 
are included, and foreign operating carriers are eliminated.  Second, observations are dropped 
when market fares are less than $30, which helps to rule out heavily discounted fares that could 
be associated with passengers using their accumulated frequent-flyer miles to partially offset cost 
of trip.  Third, as defined before, only pure online14
In our opinion, much is not lost by focusing on nonstop products instead of considering 
both nonstop and connecting products.  First, Gayle and Wu (2013) provide structural 
econometric evidence revealing that in most markets nonstop and connecting products have 
sufficiently weak cross-price elasticity of demand such that if connecting products were 
 nonstop itineraries are considered in each 
origin-destination market.   
                                                 
14 A pure online air travel product means that the passenger remains on a single carrier’s plane(s) for the entire round 
trip.  In addition, the carrier that transports the passenger for this type of product is the same carrier that markets and 
sold the product to the passenger.  Pure online products are the most popular type of products in US domestic air 
travel markets.  For more discussion on various types of air travel products in US domestic markets see Ito and Lee 
(2007) and Gayle (2008). 
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artificially removed from markets containing both product types, the remaining nonstop product 
prices typically will not increase by more than 1%.  As such, they argue that these two product 
types can be treated as being in separate product markets.  Second, Brueckner, Lee and Singer 
(2013) also provide evidence that the competitive impact of connecting products on nonstop 
products is relatively weaker than the competitive impact of nonstop products on other nonstop 
products. 
  We create a “quantity” variable by aggregating passengers by airline in each origin-
destination market.  This quantity variable is used to help define a “valid” incumbent.  Following 
Berry (1992), a firm is considered a “valid” incumbent in a market during the quarter when the 
quantity of passengers appearing in the DB1B survey for the airline in this market is larger or 
equal to 90.  The price variable is the mean ticket fare by airline in each market.  The 3rd 
quarter/second period data are then collapsed so that a given airline only appears once in each 
market.   
Unlike the 3rd quarter data, the 1st quarter data are less restricted by not solely focusing on 
nonstop itineraries.  For purposes of the static entry model, the set of potential entrants to a 
market refers to airlines that have some airport presence in at least one endpoint city of the 
market in the 1st quarter plus airlines that actually serve the market in the 3rd quarter.  The final 
dataset has sample size of 12,401 observations spread across 777 origin-destination markets, and 
a total of 22 U.S. domestic airlines.   
Table 1 provides a list of all airlines that are involved in the sample dataset in the 3rd 
quarter of 2007.  The table gives an idea how relatively active an airline is based on the number 
of markets served.  
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Table 1  
Airlines represented in the dataset in the 3rd Quarter of 2007 
Code Airline 
Number of markets served  
by each carrier 
AA American Airlines Inc. 190 
AS Alaska Airlines Inc. 63 
B6 JetBlue Airways 95 
CO Continental Air Lines Inc. 64 
DL Delta Air Lines Inc. 227 
F9 Frontier Airlines 80 
FL AirTran Airways  176 
HP America West Airlines 2 
NK Spirit Air Lines 52 
NW Northwest Airlines Inc. 116 
SX Skybus Airlines, Inc. 3 
SY Sun Country Airlines  22 
TZ ATA Airlines 7 
U5 USA 3000 Airlines 20 
UA United Air Lines Inc. 216 
US US Airways Inc. 149 
WN Southwest Airlines 304 
YX Midwest Airlines 23 
Other** GQ/ OO/ QX/ RD/ XE 0 
**Other includes GQ(Big Sky Airlines), OO(Skywest Airlines), QX(Horizon Air),  
RD(Ryan International Airlines), and  XE(Expressjet Airlines).  These airlines in the  
“Other” category did not actually serve any of our sample  markets, but they were  
potential entrants in some markets. 
 
 
Table 2 reports the number of potential entrants that serve 0 (City 0), 1 (City 1), or 2 
(City 2) endpoint cities of the markets in our sample during period 1.15
                                                 
15 The reason why it is possible to have a subset of our defined potential entrants that do not serve an endpoint 
airport in the relevant market is because, on rare occasions, these airlines enter a market in the same period they 
establish presence at both endpoint airports.      
  The table also shows the 
number and percent of these potential entrants that actually serve the market in period 2.  Among 
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the potential entrants, only three firms do not have presence at endpoint cities in the first period.  
These three firms all enter markets in the second period, and are considered as incumbents in that 
period.  Among the 4,400 potential entrants that only serve one city of a pair in the first period, 
0.84% of them decide to enter the market in the second period.  On the other hand, among the 
7,998 potential entrants that serve both endpoint cities of the market in the first period, 22.1% of 
them decide to enter the market in the second period.  This evidence suggests that firms who 
serve both endpoints in a city pair more easily enter the market in the subsequent period.  These 
firms can easily take advantage of their access to both airports in that market, so that the cost of 
entry will likely be lower for them compared to other firms that do not yet have access to both 
airports.  As such, we treat City2 as an observed firm-specific measure of heterogeneity that 
shifts firms’ profit and therefore influences entry decisions.   
In addition, we construct variables such as “Population”, “Nonstop Flight Distance”, and 
“Nonstop Flight Distance Squared” that are defined previously.  Table 3 reports descriptive 
statistics of the sample data. 
 
 
Table 2 
Number of Potential Entrants by Number of Cities Served 
No. of Cities  
Served 
Total No. of  
Potential Entrants 
No. of entry  
in the 2nd Period % of Entry 
City 0 3 3 - 
City 1 4,400 37 0.84 
City 2 7,998 1,770 22.13 
Total 12,401 1,810 - 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Population 
 
 
Product of population from the  
origin and destination cities, in one 
hundred trillions 
0.0154 0.0536 2.09E-05 0.7078 
Distance 
 
Nonstop flight distance, in ten  
thousands of miles 0.1108 0.0627 0.0177 0.2704 
Income 
 
  
Product of median incomes at the origin  
and destination cities, measured in ten 
billion dollars 
0.2181 0.0788 0.0817 0.5869 
Slot_dummy 
 
 
 
 
Equals to 1 if any of the airports are slot-
controlled.  The slot-controlled airports are 
New York LaGuardia, New York 
Kennedy, Washington National, and 
Chicago O'Hare 
0.1743 0.3793 0 1 
City1 
 
 
Equals 1 if carrier operates in only one 
 endpoint airport of the market in 1st 
quarter 
0.3548 0.4785 0 1 
City2 
 
 
Equals 1 if carrier operates in both  
endpoint airports of the market in 1st 
quarter 
0.6449 0.4785 0 1 
I 
 
 
Equals 1 if the potential entrant  
actually enters the market 
 
0.1460 0.3531 0 1 
K 
 
 
Number of potential entrants for 
 each market 
 
16.2541 2.1414 10 21 
HUB_dummy 
 
 
Equal to 1 if carrier has a Hub at  
one or both market endpoints 
 
0.1500 0.3571 0 1 
City2*Alliance_dummy 
 
 
 
Equal to 1 if carrier operates at  
both market endpoints in the 1st quarter 
and has an alliance partner present at one 
or both market endpoints.   
0.5579 0.4967 0 1 
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Table 3 continues 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
N Number of actual entrants to a market 2.3505 0.6230 2 6 
No. of entry threats 
Number of potential entrants that have 
presence at both market endpoints in 
period 1, but did not enter the market in 
period 2.  
8.1244 1.8852 1 14 
No. of entry threats  
(no HUB at market 
endpoints) 
Number of entry threats that do not use any 
of the market endpoints as a Hub  7.5254 1.7888 1 13 
No. of entry threats 
(with HUB at one or 
both market endpoints) 
Number of entry threats that use one or 
both market endpoints as a Hub 0.5990 0.7572 0 5 
No. of entry threats  
allied with at least one 
incumbent 
 
Number of entry threats to the market who 
are allied with at least one incumbent in the 
market 
1.5396 0.9303 0 4 
Price_50th Market 50th percentile of price levels 192.05 64.62 78.58 597.83 
Price_25th Market 25th percentile of price levels 167.53 55.86 60.09 379.48 
Price_75th Market 75th percentile of price levels 216.90 74.37 87.17 690.93 
 
 
Note that Na is the sum of the dummy variable “I” in a given market.  “K” is the total 
number of possible entrants in a market.  Following up on a previous example we discussed in 
the definitions section, the route of ATL-DEN contains 4 actual entrants out of 19 possible 
entrants (i.e. Na=4 and K=19).  “No. of entry threats (Net)” is the subset of potential entrants that 
have a presence at both endpoint airports of a market in period 1, but did not actually enter the 
relevant market in period 2.  In other words, according to much of the literature “No. of entry 
threats (Net)” is the total number of potential entrants that poses a real and credible entry threat.  
Note that the mean of “No. of entry threats (Net)” is much smaller than the mean of K.    
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6. Results  
This section presents the results from estimating the empirical model discussed above.  
Table 4 presents results from the entry model.  The entry model estimates suggest that the 
profitability of firm entry in a market is increasing in the size of the market as measured by 
population, which is consistent with results in Berry (1992).  As expected, an increase in 
consumers’ income also increases the profitability of entry.  Profitability of firm entry seems to 
be increasing in distance up to some distance threshold, then decrease in distance thereafter.  The 
negative coefficient on Slot_dummy indicates that a firm is likely to find entry less profitable if 
any of the airports is slot-controlled, which are: New York LaGuardia; New York Kennedy; 
Washington National; and Chicago O'Hare airports.   
 
Table 4 
Parameter Estimates for Entry Model 
Variable Parameter est.  std. error 
Constant -3.2518 * 0.2821 
Population 4.7134 * 0.0761 
Distance 2.2734 * 0.1620 
(Distance)2 -8.9535 * 0.3909 
Income 6.6341 * 0.1699 
Slot_dummy -0.4221 * 0.0199 
City2 3.3342 * 0.2816 
HUB_dummy 0.0011  0.6330 
City2*Alliance_dummy -0.4112 * 0.0102 
Number of competing firms 
(𝛿𝜋) -1.5068 * 0.0284 
Number of entry threats(𝜆𝜋) -0.0526 * 0.0084 
Correlation(η) -0.9998 * 0.0012 
    
Number of obs.  12401   
GMM objective 0.1700   *represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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The positive coefficient on City2 suggests that a firm is likely to find entry more 
profitable if it has presence in both endpoint cities in the period prior to the entry period under 
consideration.  The effect is statistically significant, and therefore implies that we should allow 
for firm heterogeneity in the entry model, as suggested by Berry (1992).  The positive coefficient 
estimate on Hub_dummy suggests that carriers that use one or both market endpoint airports as a 
hub may find market entry profitable, however, this coefficient is statistically insignificant.  The 
negative coefficient on City2*Alliance_dummy suggests that a firm finds it less profitable to 
enter a market if it has presence at both market endpoints, and also has an alliance partner 
present at both market endpoints.  
As expected, 𝛿𝜋 is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that actual entry 
reduces profitability.  This result is consistent with standard oligopoly theory, which predicts that 
profitability should decline with increased competition.  Similarly, 𝜆𝜋 is negative, suggesting that 
the profitability of entry decreases with increased entry threat.  In addition, the marginal profit 
effect of entry threat is relatively small compared to the marginal profit effect of actual entry. 
Recall that the parameter, η, measures the correlation of profit components that are 
unobserved to the researcher but observed by firms.  This parameter is statistically different from 
zero at conventional levels of significance, and its point estimate (-0.9998) suggests a strong 
correlation of unobserved profit components across firms in a market.  This effect suggests that 
market-wide shocks are strong relative to firm-level shocks. 16
As mentioned previously, the main purpose in this paper is to re-examine the issue of 
how incumbents respond to the threat of entry in the airlines industry.  Our methodology 
explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of market structure.  In particular, the estimates of the 
     
                                                 
16 We also estimate the entry model using data samples drawn from different time periods. For example, we use the 
third quarter of 2007 as the first period and the first quarter of 2008 as the second period.  We find that results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported above.             
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entry model allow us to correct for this problem of potential endogeneity in incumbents’ price 
regression.  Results for price regressions are shown in Table 5.  Specification (1) in the table 
captures the average effect of entry threats.  In Specification (2), we decompose the effect of 
entry threats based on: (1) whether a market endpoint airport is a hub for a potential entrant; and 
(2) whether a potential entrant has an alliance partnership with any of the market incumbents. 
Recall that the unit of analysis for these regressions is at the market level.  As such, the 
dependent variable for a price equation is either the market 50th percentile value, 25th percentile 
value, or 75th percentile value.  This table only reports results for the 50th percentiles, while 
results of the 25th and 75th percentiles are shown in the appendix. 
The left column in Specification (1) shows the results from model without the 
endogeneity correction variable.17  These estimates suggest that airfare is increasing in market 
size, as measured by population.  Second, the positive coefficient estimate on the Slot_dummy 
variable suggests that airfare is higher in markets that include a slot-controlled airport.  Third, the 
sign pattern of the coefficient estimates on Distance and (Distance)2 suggests that airfare 
increases with distance between the origin and destination cities up to some threshold distance, 
but declines in distance thereafter. 18
 
       
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Recall that the “Endogeneity correction” variable is, 𝐸�[𝑢𝑚0|𝑋𝑚,𝑍𝑚,𝑁𝑚𝑎 ,𝑁𝑚𝑒𝑡]. 
18 The coefficient estimates on Distance and (Distance)2  imply a distance threshold of 4,413 miles [= 10,000 * 
4.9999/(2*5.664)], which is outside the range of distances in our data sample.  Therefore, the airfare is continuously 
increasing with distance in our data sample.   
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Table 5 Parameter Estimates for Price Regressions  
that Capture the Effect of Entry Threats on Median Market Price 
  Specification (1)   Specification (2) 
  Without  Endog. Corr.   
With  
Endog. Corr.     
Without  
Endog. Corr.   
With  
Endog. Corr.   
Population 0.5365 * 0.5376 *   0.5737 * 0.5769 * 
 (0.1667)  (0.1663)   (0.1604)  (0.1601)  
Income -0.0584  -0.0351   -0.0052  0.0137  
 (0.1056)  (0.1059)   (0.1022)  (0.1024)  
Distance 4.9999 * 4.9989 *  5.4705 * 5.4616 * 
 (0.5238)  (0.5226)   (0.5050)  (0.5040)  
(Distance)2 -5.6640 * -5.7132 *  -7.6680 * -7.6747 * 
 (1.9547)  (1.9501)   (1.8923)  (1.8883)  
Slot_dummy 0.0878 * 0.0882 *  0.0570 * 0.0573 * 
 (0.0234)  (0.0234)   (0.0227)  (0.0227)  
No. of competing firms -0.0456 * -0.0473 *  -0.0774 * -0.0787 * 
 (0.0131)  (0.0131)   (0.0130)  (0.0130)  
No. of entry threats -0.0084 + -0.0077 +      
 (0.0044)  (0.0044)       
No. of entry threats (no HUB at 
market endpoints) 
     -0.0019  -0.0011  
     (0.0045)  (0.0045)  
No. of entry threats (with HUB 
at one or both market endpoints) 
     -0.0211 * -0.0216 * 
     (0.0103)  (0.0103)  
No. of entry threats (allied with 
at least one incumbent) 
     0.0758 * 0.0752 * 
     (0.0088)  (0.0088)  
Endogeneity Correction Variable   -16401 *    -14870 * 
   (7534)     (7219)  
Constant 4.9093 * 4.9050 *  4.7990 * 4.7956 * 
 (0.0543)  (0.0542)   (0.0534)  (0.0533)  
N=777          
R-squared   0.5292   0.5321     0.5712   0.5735   
*represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  +represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  Recall that the “Endogeneity correction” variable is, E�[um0|Xm, Zm, Nma , Nmet]. 
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Consistent with the findings in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), the negative signs of 
actual entry and entry threat coefficients suggest that incumbents cut prices when faced with 
increased actual competitors or entry threats.  While Goolsbee and Syverson’s incumbent price 
regression measures these effects based on time dummy coefficients surrounding the period of 
the event, our study looks at incumbents’ price response to changes in the numbers of actual 
competitors, and threatening potential competitors.  The results here indicate that prices fall by 
an average 4.56% when the actual number of competitors increases by one firm.  On the other 
hand, prices only drop by an average 0.84% when incumbents face an additional entry threat.  
Therefore, the degree of incumbent price-cutting is different in response to actual entry 
compared to the threat of entry.  Specifically, incumbent firms seem to cut price more in 
response to an increase in actual number of competitors as compared to an increase in the 
number of firms that threaten to enter.  This evidence is consistent with findings in Morrison 
(2001) and Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010).     
The right column in Specification (1) shows estimation results when the endogeneity 
correction variable is included as a regressor.  This endogeneity correction variable accounts for 
the fact that “No. of competing firms” variable is endogenous in the price regression.  The results 
show that the coefficients are roughly similar in magnitude compared to the case without 
endogeneity correction.  We find that the average effect of actual entry is marginally larger when 
endogeneity of market structure is taken into account.  An increase in number of actual entry is 
associated with a price drop of 4.73% in case of the endogeneity-corrected specification, as 
compared to a price drop of 4.56% in case of specifications without endogeneity correction.  
Therefore, the measured average price effect from actual entry could be slightly underestimated 
if we ignore the endogeneity of market structure.   
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When it comes to the average effects due to the threat of entry, the market median price 
drops 0.77% with an additional threat of entry in the case of the endogeneity-corrected 
specification.  This average price effect is marginally smaller than the 0.84% average price drop 
in case of the specification without endogeneity correction.  Therefore, the measured average 
price effect from the threat of entry could be slightly overestimated if we ignore the endogeneity 
of market structure. 
Note that the significantly negative coefficient on the “Endogeneity correction” variable 
implies a negative relationship between price shocks and profit shocks.  This negative coefficient 
implies that, on average, the unobserved factors affect both observed prices and probability of 
firm entry in the opposite direction.  Even though controlling for potential endogeneity only 
marginally affects the estimated parameters in this data sample, we still recommend reinforcing 
the model with the endogeneity correction term so as to mitigate the potential biases in 
estimating incumbents’ responses that could be present in other data samples.          
Now focusing on the econometric estimates from Specification (2) in Table 5, we see that 
incumbents lower price by more when entry threats have a hub at one or both market endpoints.  
In other words, potential entrants that have a hub at the market endpoint seem to pose a greater 
competitive threat to incumbents in the market.  In case of the endogeneity corrected coefficient 
estimates, we see that incumbents cut airfares by 2.16% when face with an entry threat from a 
potential entrant who has a hub at one or both of the market endpoints.  On the other hand, 
incumbents have small and statistically insignificant response (0.11%) to an entry threat when 
the potential entrant does not use any of the market endpoints as a hub.  We argue that this 
asymmetric response from incumbents is likely driven by the fact that potential entrants with hub 
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airports at the market endpoints can better exploit economies of passenger-traffic density and 
therefore will have lower marginal cost upon actual entry. 
A second key result in Specification (2) is that incumbents seem to increase rather than 
lower their price if they have an alliance partnership with the “potential entrant”. 19
Last, as a robustness check on whether our qualitative results are sensitive to seasonality, 
we also estimate the entry model and pricing equation using data samples drawn from the same 
quarter in different years.  Specifically, we use the third quarter of 2006 as the first period, and 
the third quarter of 2007 as the second period.  We find that results, which are reported in Table 
A.3 and Table A.4 in the appendix, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4 and 
Table 5 above.     
  The 
coefficient estimate suggests that incumbents raise price approximately 7% when the potential 
entrant present at both market endpoints is an alliance partner.   We argue that if the carrier 
present at the endpoint airports has an alliance partnership with an incumbent, this alliance 
partnership can enable the incumbent to charge a higher price due to consumers’ increased 
preference for alliance partners’ products.  An alliance may increase consumers’ preference for 
partner carriers’ products since passengers have greater opportunities to accumulate and redeem 
frequent-flyer miles across partner carriers [Lederman (2007)], especially when partner carriers’ 
networks are complementary rather than overlapping. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Much of the airline industry literature identifies a potential entrant to a market based on 
whether the relevant carrier has presence in at least one of the endpoint airports of the market 
                                                 
19 This result is consistent with some of the findings in Armantier and Richard (2006).  Also see Zhang and Czerny 
(2012). 
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without actually operating between the endpoints.  Furthermore, several studies elevate the status 
of a potential entrant to a credible “entry threat” to market incumbents once the potential entrant 
establishes presence at the second endpoint airport of the market.  However, a key point we make 
in this paper is that even when potential entrants have presence at both endpoint airports of a 
market, these “potential entrants” may not all be effective “competitive threats” to incumbents in 
the market.  Our paper provides evidence of two situations in which potential entrants that have 
presence at both endpoint airports of a market are not effective “competitive threats” to 
incumbents in the market. 
First, we find evidence that incumbents lower price by more when entry threats have a 
hub at one or both market endpoints.  In other words, potential entrants that have a hub at the 
market endpoint seem to pose a greater competitive threat to incumbents in the market.  In fact, 
our estimates suggest that incumbents cut airfares by 2.16% when face with an entry threat from 
a potential entrant who has a hub at one or both of the market endpoints, but incumbents have 
small and statistically insignificant response (0.11%) to an entry threat when the potential entrant 
does not use any of the market endpoints as a hub.  We argue that this asymmetric response from 
incumbents is likely driven by the fact that potential entrants with hub airports at the market 
endpoints can better exploit economies of passenger-traffic density and therefore will have lower 
marginal cost upon actual entry. 
Second, we find evidence that incumbents seem to increase rather than lower their price 
if they have an alliance partnership with the “potential entrant”.  Specifically, we estimate that 
incumbents raise price approximately 7% when the potential entrant present at both market 
endpoints is an alliance partner.  We argue that if the carrier present at the endpoint airports has 
an alliance partnership with an incumbent, this alliance partnership can enable the incumbent to 
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charge a higher price due to consumers’ increased preference for products offered by alliance 
partners.  As suggested in Lederman (2007), an alliance can increase the desirability for partner 
carriers’ products since the alliance provides passengers with greater opportunities to accumulate 
and redeem frequent-flyer miles across partner carriers.  This is especially true when partner 
carriers’ networks are complementary rather than overlapping. 
Apart from our two key findings described above, our econometric estimates yield other 
interesting results.  First, an increase in the number of actual entrants reduces profitability, which 
coincides with results in Berry (1992).  Second, incumbents’ price response is different when 
faced with increased actual competitors compared to increased entry threat.  In particular, 
incumbents seem to cut price more in response to an increase in actual number of competitors, as 
compared to an increase in the number of firms that threaten to enter.  This finding is consistent 
with Morrison (2001), which studies the effect of various forms of actual, adjacent, and potential 
competition from Southwest Airline.  Third, when the endogeneity of market structure is taken 
into account, we find that the average price effect of actual entry is marginally larger compared 
to when endogeneity is not taken into account.  Conversely, when the endogeneity of market 
structure is taken into account, the average price effect of an entry threat is marginally smaller 
compared to when endogeneity is not taken into account.  
The econometric model we use in this paper is static in nature.  As such, our model is not 
ideal to capture dynamics in incumbents’ response to actual entry and the threat of entry.  For 
example, we did not attempt to analyze if incumbents initially respond aggressively but dampen 
their response overtime.  Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) attempt to answer issues of this nature 
within their reduced-form econometric framework.  However, a structural econometric 
framework that explicitly incorporates optimal dynamic behavior might improve our 
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understanding of these issues.  Of course a dynamic entry model is more challenging to 
implement and estimate, but may be rewarding in terms of the type of questions that can be 
answered, and therefore deserves an attempt by future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Parameter Estimates for Price Regressions 
using the log of Market 25th Percentile Price Levels as the Dependent Variable. 
  Specification (1)   Specification (2) 
  Without  Endog. Corr.   
With  
Endog. Corr.      
Without  
Endog. Corr.   
With  
Endog. Corr.   
Population 0.1852  0.1858    0.2288  0.2304  
 (0.1730)  (0.1729)   (0.1684)  (0.1684)  
Income -0.0818  -0.0695   -0.0417  -0.0322  
 (0.1096)  (0.1102)   (0.1073)  (0.1077)  
Distance 6.1325 * 6.1320 *  6.5365 * 6.5320 * 
 (0.5436)  (0.5435)   (0.5302)  (0.5302)  
(Distance)2 -9.9334 * -9.9593 *  -11.6372 * -11.6406 * 
 (2.0285)  (2.0283)   (1.9866)  (1.9866)  
Slot_dummy 0.1286 * 0.1288 *  0.0999 * 0.1001 * 
 (0.0243)  (0.0243)   (0.0239)  (0.0239)  
No. of competing firms -0.0622 * -0.0632 *  -0.0905 * -0.0911 * 
 (0.0136)  (0.0136)   (0.0137)  (0.0137)  
No. of entry threats -0.0059  -0.0055       
 (0.0046)  (0.0046)       
No. of entry threats (no HUB at 
market endpoints) 
     0.0007  0.0011  
     (0.0047)  (0.0047)  
No. of entry threats (with HUB at one 
or both market endpoints) 
     -0.0225 * -0.0227 * 
     (0.0108)  (0.0108)  
No. of entry threats (allied with at 
least one incumbent) 
     0.0679 * 0.0676 * 
     (0.0093)  (0.0093)  
Endogeneity Correction Variable   -8616     -7456  
   (7836)     (7594)  
Constant 4.7364 * 4.7342 *  4.6361 * 4.6344 * 
 (0.0563)  (0.0564)   (0.0561)  (0.0561)  
N=777          
R-squared   0.5146   0.5154    0.5476   0.5481   
*represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  +represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.2 Parameter Estimates for Price Regressions 
using the log of Market 75th Percentile Price Levels as the Dependent Variable. 
  Specification (1)   Specification (2) 
  Without  Endog. Corr.   
With  
Endog. Corr.     
Without  
Endog. Corr.   
With  
Endog. Corr.   
Population 0.5970 * 0.5985 *  0.6296 * 0.6343 * 
 (0.1729)  (0.1720)   (0.1662)  (0.1654)  
Income 0.0604  0.0941   0.1212  0.1492  
 (0.1096)  (0.1096)   (0.1059)  (0.1058)  
Distance 4.5171 * 4.5156 *  5.0241 * 5.0109 * 
 (0.5435)  (0.5406)   (0.5234)  (0.5208)  
(Distance)2 -4.0785 * -4.1497 *  -6.2478 * -6.2577 * 
 (2.0281)  (2.0173)   (1.9611)  (1.9513)  
Slot_dummy 0.0572 * 0.0578 *  0.0253  0.0259  
 (0.0243)  (0.0242)   (0.0236)  (0.0234)  
No. of competing firms -0.0183  -0.0209   -0.0520 * -0.0539 * 
 (0.0136)  (0.0135)   (0.0135)  (0.0135)  
No. of entry threats -0.0103 * -0.0093 *      
 (0.0046)  (0.0046)       
No. of entry threats (no HUB at 
market endpoints) 
     -0.0040  -0.0028  
     (0.0047)  (0.0047)  
No. of entry threats (with HUB at 
one or both market endpoints) 
     -0.0204 
+ -0.0211 * 
     (0.0107)  (0.0106)  
No. of entry threats (allied with at 
least one incumbent) 
     0.0799 * 0.0790 * 
     (0.0091)  (0.0091)  
Endogeneity Correction Variable   -23753 *    -22017 * 
   (7793)     (7459)  
Constant 4.9884 * 4.9822 *  4.8731 * 4.8681 * 
 (0.0563)  (0.0561)   (0.0554)  (0.0551)  
N=777          
R-squared   0.5005   0.5064    0.546   0.5511   
*represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  +represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.3 Parameter Estimates for Entry Model 
Variable Parameter est.  std. error 
Constant 0.1688 * 0.0053 
Population 13.0303 * 0.0149 
Distance 1.7832 * 0.0219 
(Distance)2 -1.0759 * 0.1004 
Income 9.5743 * 0.0086 
Slot_dummy -1.8253 * 0.0002 
City2 4.3901 * 0.0008 
HUB_dummy 4.3831 * 0.0103 
City2*Alliance_dummy -0.5891 * 0.0027 
Number of competing firms 
(𝛿𝜋) -6.3745 * 0.0085 
Number of entry threats(𝜆𝜋) -0.8729 * 0.0037 
Correlation(η) -0.9999 * 0.0008 
    
Number of obs.  12881   
GMM objective 0.1797   
*represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table A.4 Parameter Estimates for Price Regressions  
that Capture the Effect of Entry Threats on Median Market Price 
  Specification (1)   Specification (2) 
  
Without  
Endog. 
Corr. 
  With  Endog. Corr.     
Without  
Endog. Corr.   
With  
Endog. Corr.   
Pop 0.5473 * 0.5477 *   0.5717 * 0.5724 * 
 (0.1669)  (0.1668)   (0.1607)  (0.1606)  
Income -0.0816  -0.0723   -0.0055  0.0016  
 (0.1059)  (0.1061)   (0.1024)  (0.1025)  
Distance 4.9483 * 4.9810 *  5.4562 * 5.4810 * 
 (0.5254)  (0.5258)   (0.5072)  (0.5076)  
(Distance)2 -5.5106 * -5.6300 *  -7.6362 * -7.7220 * 
 (1.9620)  (1.9630)   (1.9005)  (1.9020)  
Slot_dummy 0.0927 * 0.0920 *  0.0548 * 0.0543 * 
 (0.0234)  (0.0234)   (0.0229)  (0.0229)  
No. of competing firms -0.0461 * -0.0462 *  -0.0799 * -0.0798 * 
 (0.0131)  (0.0131)   (0.0131)  (0.0131)  
No. of entry threats -0.0046  -0.0049       
 (0.0046)  (0.0046)       
No. of entry threats (no HUB at 
market endpoints) 
     -0.0003  -0.0005  
     (0.0046)  (0.0046)  
No. of entry threats (with HUB at one 
or both market endpoints) 
     -0.0122  -0.0127  
     (0.0101)  (0.0101)  
No. of entry threats (allied with at least 
one incumbent)  
     0.0751 * 0.0748 * 
     (0.0088)  (0.0088)  
Endogeneity Correction   -5.44E+10     -4.46E+10  
   (4.11E+10)     (3.94E+10)  
Constant 4.8876 * 4.8860 *  4.7883 * 4.7880 * 
 (0.0550)  (0.0549)   (0.0539)  (0.0539)  
          
N=777          
R-squared   0.5276   0.5287    0.5685   0.5693   
*represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  +represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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